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Abstract 
 I analyze the determinants of China’s foreign energy investments during the period 2001 
to 2014.  These investments include mergers and acquisitions and portfolio investments as well 
as loans.  My analysis is done at the country level.  I consider the effects of factors suggesting 
motives of market access (such as GDP and Chinese FDI), efficiency/cost reduction (such as 
GDP growth and per-capita GDP), access to energy resources (such as oil and natural gas 
reserves) and building political support (such as the presence of arms trade).  I estimate the 
determinants of investment using a Tobit model with random effects, a two-stage Heckman 
Selection model, and Two-Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) simultaneous equations.  I find that 
Chinese investors take into account considerations of securing access to energy resources, 
primarily oil, and building political support for China internationally, in tandem with their 
commercial motives to secure market access and reduce costs.  For the largest investments, the 
motive to secure long-term control over oil supplies is especially strong. 
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1. Introduction 
“We should think about what China really needs.  I’ve considered this.  Natural gas and oil are 
the resources that China currently has the most pressing need for.” 
—Chen Yuan, Governor of China Development Bank, 2009 (quoted in Mocker, 2014, pg. 23). 
 Over the last fifteen years, the People’s Republic of China, through its state-run energy 
firms, banks, and sovereign wealth funds, has engaged in an extraordinary level of foreign 
investment in the energy sector.  From Brunei to Ecuador, Chinese institutions have committed 
billions of dollars to investments in mergers and acquisitions and portfolio investments targeted 
at foreign energy firms and loans to foreign governments and firms backed by the delivery of 
energy resources.1  China’s growing presence in the global energy sector has raised questions as 
to whether its investors’ motives are purely commercial or also align with the state’s goals of 
enhancing energy security and China’s global economic and political presence.  I identify the 
major motives of China’s foreign energy investors through empirically investigating the major 
determinants of their reported investments. 
China’s spectacular economic growth since the country’s “Reform and Opening Up” (改
革开放) beginning in 1978 has led the country to experience mounting energy insecurity, as its 
growing domestic demand for oil and natural gas vastly outpaces domestic supplies.  In 2009, 
China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest consumer of energy (Dannreuther, 2011) 
and in 2013, it also claimed the title of the world’s largest importer of oil (EIA, 2015).  In 
addition to developing new sources of domestic energy production, China’s leadership has 
turned to international markets to obtain new energy supplies for China.  At its first meeting in 
                                                          
1 I include loans in my definition of “investment” for the sake of consistency with Mocker (2014), the piece of 
literature most directly relevant to my work. 
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2010, China’s National Energy Commission declared “securing energy supply through 
international co-operation” to be one of its six major areas of focus (Jiang & Sinton, 2011, pg. 
12).  These efforts have come within the context of a larger Chinese shift towards global 
economic expansion and investment, emphasized in the “Going Out” (走去出) policy announced 
in 1999 (Buckley et al, 2007, pg. 3).  This policy encouraged Chinese enterprises not merely to 
increase international trade, but specifically to increase investment abroad and seek new revenue 
sources from foreign markets. 
 As a result, Chinese investments have taken on a major role in the global energy sector, 
especially in oil and natural gas.  These investments have been made in the form of both equity 
investments (Mergers & Acquisitions and portfolio investments) and loans.  They have been 
extended by three main categories of state-owned investor firms: China’s national oil companies 
(NOCs), policy banks, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).  The motives of these energy 
investments are fiercely debated.  Foremost is the question of whether these investments 
primarily follow the commercial interests of the investor firms, or whether they are the work of 
“China, Inc.: China’s government, state-owned banks, and NOCs operating as a coherent entity 
in a global pursuit of energy” (Downs, 2011, pg. 3). 
 Building on a framework of theoretical motives for foreign investment and for Chinese 
foreign investment specifically, I construct a theoretical model of the choice of investors.  I 
propose that Chinese investors have four primary motives for foreign energy investments: market 
access, efficiency/cost-reductions, resource access, and building political support for China.  I 
hypothesize that Chinese foreign energy investment at the country level will follow proxies for 
these four motives.  My hypotheses are tested using a Tobit model for initial analysis, a two-
stage Heckman selection model to consider the decisions of what countries to invest in and how 
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much to invest in each separately, and a 2SLS simultaneous equations model to investigate the 
relationship between energy investment and Chinese OFDI. 
 I expand on prior literature through both my specific focus on Chinese foreign energy 
investments and my consideration of a full range of major theoretical motives for foreign 
investment in its hypotheses.  Whereas previous studies focusing specifically on Chinese energy 
investments examined the effect of risk factors that might deter investment, such as sovereign 
credit ratings and institutional quality, I look back to the theoretical literature on foreign 
investment to identify what factors encourage investment in the first place.  Accordingly, my 
main emphasis is on the motives of investors in seeking foreign energy investment, whether 
those motives are commercial or otherwise. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows.  First, I provide some background on the recent 
historical development of China’s foreign energy investments, and on the different types of 
investors.  I then review theoretical and empirical literature of interest on the determinants of 
foreign investment, Chinese foreign investment, and Chinese foreign energy investment.  Next, I 
present the theoretical model for the choice of investors, followed by the hypotheses and 
empirical procedures used.  I then detail my data sources and provide summary statistics, and 
proceed to describe the results for each of the empirical models.  Finally, I conclude with 
remarks on the implications of my research and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Background of China’s Foreign Energy Investments 
2.1 Background of China’s Energy Security 
In the Maoist era from 1949 to 1976, the People’s Republic of China was largely isolated 
from international trade and investment, but did engage in a degree of oil trade.  In the 1950s and 
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early 1960s, China imported a significant volume of oil from the Soviet Union (Qian, 2011, pg. 
4).  The discovery of larger domestic reserves, most notably the Daqing oil field in 1959, enabled 
China to become Asia’s largest oil producer and a net exporter by the 1970s.  However, the rapid 
industrialization and economic growth that followed the Reform and Opening Up in 1978 led 
China’s energy demand to outstrip its domestic supplies.  It again became a net oil importer in 
1993 (Jiang & Sinton, 2011, pg. 10), the year after Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” led to a 
resurgence of economic growth.  In 2013, China surpassed the United States as the world’s 
largest oil importer (EIA, 2015). 
Figure 1.1: China’s Oil Production and Consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The vast majority of these imports are obtained from the Middle East, Africa, and the 
former Soviet Union. China’s dependence on foreign oil is set to continue to grow, as its 
economy continues to grow rapidly and its aging domestic oil fields approach their peak 
production (EIA, 2015). 
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Figure 1.2: China’s Oil Imports by Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China’s natural gas consumption, while still much smaller than its oil consumption, has 
risen more rapidly in the last decade, increasing more than 5-fold from 2000 to 2013 (EIA, 
2015).  China has the largest natural gas reserves in the Asia-Pacific, and was a net exporter of 
gas until 2007.  This rapid growth in gas consumption comes in the context of China’s massive 
pollution problems as it continues to rely heavily on coal power, and thus seeks to develop 
natural gas in order to reduce its coal use and its oil dependence.  In terms of imports, China is 
investing heavily in both pipeline construction and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals.  
China became the world’s third-largest LNG importer in 2012, behind Japan and South Korea. 
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Figure 1.3: China’s Natural Gas Production and Consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coal continues to serve as China’s main energy source, and the country has been the 
world’s largest coal producer and consumer since the early 1980s.  However, China’s own coal 
reserves have for the most part been able to satiate its demand.  In 2009, China did become a net 
coal importer, but coal imports, unlike oil and natural gas, account for only a small fraction of 
the country’s total coal consumption.  In any case, China’s coal imports have been driven more 
by logistical incentives—being cheaper to import coal by sea than to transport it by rail or truck 
from its remote western regions—than by genuine energy security concerns, as China’s coal  
Figure 1.4: China’s Energy Consumption by Type 
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production remains at approximate parity with its consumption (EIA, 2015).  For these reasons, 
China’s foreign investments in coal will not be included within this analysis.  To do so would 
dilute this research’s focus on China’s energy security challenges, by including an energy type 
which China has adequate domestic reserves of. 
As evidenced by the creation of a National Energy Commission in 2010, energy security 
issues have been assigned great importance by China’s leadership.  Part of China’s response has 
been to increase investments in renewable energy, especially in wind and solar energy, but as 
displayed by the above chart, these energy sources constitute only a small proportion of China’s 
overall consumption.  Ensuring adequate oil and natural gas supplies thus remains China’s 
central energy security challenge.  China is investing heavily in domestic production by 
developing new oil and natural gas fields and by utilizing new exploration and production 
techniques such as hydraulic fracturing (EIA, 2015).  This has included a more forceful assertion 
of its offshore claims in the South China and the Diaoyu Islands, bringing China into conflict 
with its maritime neighbors including Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.  An example is the 
standoff with Vietnamese naval vessels that resulted from the China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation moving an oil rig into disputed waters near the Paracel Islands in May 2014 (Tiezzi, 
2016). 
China’s energy security strategy has also included a major focus on foreign investments.  
This began in earnest with the adoption of the Going Out policy in 1999, which exhorted 
Chinese firms to expand their investments and operations abroad (Jiang & Sinton, 2011).  While 
this policy was promoted across many industry sectors and saw a great surge in overall Chinese 
Outward FDI, it also coincided with the period at which China’s domestic oil consumption was 
beginning to outpace its domestic production.  Moreover, China’s energy sector was already one 
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of the more outward-looking sectors; CNPC first pursued foreign investments in Sudan, Peru, 
and Kazakhstan in the early 1990s, while the government was still encouraging firms to focus on 
domestic development (Jiang & Sinton, 2011, pg. 10). 
2.2 China’s Investors in Foreign Energy 
2.2.1 National Oil Companies 
 China’s most prolific foreign energy investors have been its three national oil companies: 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).  The efforts of the NOCs to 
invest abroad actually precede the Going Out policy, with CNPC attempting to invest in Peru in 
1992 and Sudan and Venezuela in 1996 (Jiang & Sinton, 2011, pg. 13).  However, it was not 
until after the Going Out policy in 1999 that their international expansion attempts began to 
receive significant government attention and support.  This support was couched not only as a 
means of enhancing China’s energy security, but also in terms of turning the NOCs into globally 
competitive firms, a major goal of the Going Out policy.  The NOCs’ foreign investments have 
generally been in the form of Foreign Direct Investments, including both Merger and Acquisition 
(M&A) activity, entailing the acquisition of a controlling equity stake in a company, and 
Greenfield Investments, entailing the organic creation of wholly-owned assets (ie. new 
production sites) in foreign countries.  Given data availability, the NOCs’ M&A activity will be 
the main focus of their investments that are analyzed in this thesis.2  Although this limits the 
scope of the analysis, it does permit a greater focus on the investments that entail acquiring 
existing foreign energy assets, rather than investments that simply involve the activities of 
Chinese energy firms in foreign countries.  Moreover, the volume of global M&A activity in the 
                                                          
2 As I have not found any reliable database of Chinese Greenfield investments, these are excluded from this study 
except for those detailed in the China Global Investment Tracker. 
14 
 
oil and gas sector vastly exceeds the volume of Greenfield Investments, so my data should 
continue to encapsulate the vast majority of China’s FDI in the oil and gas sector. 
Figure 1.5: Volume of Global M&A and Greenfield Investments in the Oil and Gas Sector 
 
Source: Deloitte (2013, pg. 5) 
In addition to their role in securing foreign energy supplies to address China’s energy 
security, a number of motives have been ascribed to the NOCs’ foreign investments.  Although 
they are state-owned firms, they also aim to be profitable and thus commercially viable, and 
accordingly their foreign investments play a role in enhancing revenues and reducing costs 
(Jiang & Sinton, 2011).  As the domestic market is often not very profitable for China’s NOCs as 
the government sets non-market prices (Mocker, 2014, pg. 17), this includes selling oil and 
natural gas to international markets.  Indeed, the International Energy Agency found that Chinese 
NOCs sold a high proportion of their foreign oil production to foreign markets rather than 
shipping it to China, although due to paucity of data they could not form a reasonable estimate 
(Jiang & Sinton, 2011, pg. 17).  Another potential motive is the acquisition of advanced 
technologies and expertise from foreign energy firms.  This is supported by the NOCs’ numerous 
15 
 
M&A activities and targeted at energy firms in developed countries, in addition to Joint Ventures 
they have entered with these firms.  
2.2.2 Policy Banks 
 China’s energy investors also include two state-owned policy banks: the China Export-
Import Bank and the China Development Bank (CDB).  These banks, some of China’s most 
prolific overall foreign investors, have been the subject of multiple pieces of literature 
speculating as to their motives.3  As is the case for the NOCs, this discussion has focused on 
whether the policy banks are focused primarily on the “strategic interests of the Chinese 
government,” including energy security, or the “commercial interests of Chinese firms” (Downs, 
2011, pg. 2).  Downs notes that the CDB in particular has striven to prioritize its commercial 
objectives and emerge as a major international bank, under the leadership of its Governor and 
later Chairman Chen Yuan.  At the same time, Chen and the CDB have demonstrated a 
commitment to follow through on the CDB’s mandate to “support the Chinese government’s 
medium to long-term development strategies and policies” (Downs, 2011, pg. 10).4 
 The CDB and China Ex-Im Bank’s energy investments have primarily been in the form 
of loans, to either foreign state-owned energy companies or directly to foreign governments.  
These loans often require the recipient to sell a set volume of energy supplies to China’s NOCs 
at market prices over the term of the loan.  The loans are in fact secured by the revenue the loan 
recipient earns from selling the energy supplies to the Chinese firms, (Downs, 2011, pg. 39), 
defining them as energy-backed loans (EBLs).  An EBL is thus essentially a “futures contract to 
procure oil” (Forsythe & Sanderson, 2013).  Although these loans are far fewer in number than 
the equity investments of the NOCs, they are generally larger, usually at least $4 billion, and 
                                                          
3 See Downs (2011) and Forsythe & Sanderson (2013). 
4 Paraphrasing the mission statement in the CDB’s 2009 annual report. 
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have terms of up to 20 years.  Some are also denominated in Renminbi, a component of China’s 
efforts to promote the internationalization of its currency. 
2.2.3 Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 The final major type of energy investor is the sovereign wealth fund (SWF), represented 
by the China Investment Corporation (CIC) and the SAFE Investment Company.  Rather than 
acquiring controlling shares in foreign energy companies, the SWFs’ investments are instead 
typically portfolio investments, which are the acquisition of non-controlling equity shares in 
companies.  Portfolio investments do not grant the SWFs formal control over their targets’ 
operations; however, they do help the SWFs diversify their portfolios with the equity of foreign 
energy firms.  This drive for diversification has arisen specifically in order to reduce the SWFs’ 
dependence on low-yielding U.S. Treasury bonds with higher-yielding foreign investments (Sun 
et al 2014, pg. 656).  Moreover, some of these investments are still sufficiently large (multiple 
billions) as to grant the SWFs some influence over management of target firms.  Accordingly, 
Sun et al (2014) proposes that the SWFs’ investments still share motives of seeking “strategic 
returns in policy and energy security,” by influencing foreign energy firms to be more open to 
granting concessions or joint ventures to Chinese firms (pg. 658). 
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1  Theoretical Literature 
 My analysis of China’s foreign energy investments has its foundations in the literature on 
general patterns of Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI),5 especially regarding OFDI 
                                                          
5 Outward FDI consists of the foreign direct investment that one country grants to another, while Inward FDI (IFDI) 
consists of FDI that one country receives from another.  For example, if a Chinese firm grants $100 million in FDI to 
Zimbabwe, that investment increases China’s OFDI to Zimbabwe by $100 million, and increases Zimbabwe’s IFDI 
from China by $100 million. 
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targeting resource acquisition, and on the patterns of Chinese OFDI specifically.  I also touch on 
the literature on China’s foreign aid activities, which while not a component of OFDI has been 
suggested by research to have resource-seeking motives.  I begin with the literature on the 
theoretical motives for OFDI, namely as to why foreign investment is attractive in the first place, 
and what characteristics make a host country an attractive target for FDI.  Buckley & Casson 
(1976) present a twofold theory of FDI as (1) firms seeking to internalize external markets and 
(2) firms seeking to conduct operations in locations that minimize costs.  Their theory addresses 
directly the profit motives of the firm, with each component addressing how firms use FDI to 
increase revenues and reduce costs, respectively.  Their implication is that attractive targets for 
FDI will be characterized by both large potential markets and by low costs for factors of 
production. 
 Dunning (1977) expands on something akin to this model with his “eclectic paradigm” of 
OFDI, which argues that OFDI is determined by the three primary motivations of (1) seeking 
foreign markets, (2) efficiency/cost reduction, and (3) seeking resources, including a subset of 
seeking strategic assets.  This final motivation is obviously of specific interest to studies seeking 
to address the motivations of energy investments.  The use of foreign investment in order to 
pursue the acquisition of natural resources is also addressed by theoretical work that overlaps 
with the field of international relations.  A pertinent example is Zweig’s (2006) definition of 
“resource diplomacy” as “diplomatic activity designed to enhance a nation’s access to resources 
and its energy security,” including through negotiating investment deals.  In this vein, foreign 
investment can be viewed not just as an economic decision of firms, but also as a decision of 
states that combines economic and political/diplomatic considerations in order to serve strategic 
needs such as energy security. 
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 More recently, literature has also emerged on specifically Chinese OFDI, the vast 
majority of which has emerged since the adoption of the Going Out policy in 1999.  This 
literature includes both theoretical work on the probable motives for Chinese OFDI and 
empirical work on the patterns and determinants of OFDI.  The central theoretical piece is that of 
Cai (1999), who identified four motives for Chinese OFDI: (1) new markets, (2) natural 
resources, (3) technology and managerial skills, and (4) financial capital.  With this, Cai 
recognized that the motives for foreign investment held by Chinese firms are often similar to the 
motives held by firms in developed economies, while also acknowledging the unique needs of 
Chinese firms and that “political considerations always play an important role,” especially since 
most multi-national Chinese firms are state-owned (pg. 870).  
3.2  Empirical Literature 
 The vast majority of the empirical literature on Chinese foreign investment has emerged 
in the last decade, and analyzes data reported since the Going Out policy in 1999.  One of the 
few studies to address data from before that threshold is Hong & Sun’s (2004) work, which used 
comparative data analysis rather than econometric procedure.  They analyzed changes in the 
determinants of Chinese OFDI over the course of its early development in the 1990s.  They 
found that while natural resource endowments were a significant positive determinant of OFDI, 
investments increasingly focused on acquiring foreign technologies and managerial skills over 
the course of the time period. 
Using more recent data, Buckley et al. (2007) present an empirical perspective on the 
broad theoretical question of the determinants of Chinese OFDI.  They sought to apply the 
“established theoretical explanations” of FDI, which focused on investors from developed 
countries, to “explain FDI from an emerging economy like China” (pg. 2).  Using a pooled 
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ordinary least squares model6 and a generalized least squares model incorporating random 
effects,7 they found that the target country’s market size, value of Chinese exports, and cultural 
proximity to China are all of positive significance8 to Chinese OFDI.  More surprisingly, they 
found that a country’s level of political risk is of positive significance to investment, suggesting 
that Chinese firms “do not perceive or behave towards risk in the same way as do industrialised 
country firms” (pg. 30).9  They did not, however, find that a country’s natural resource 
endowments are a significant determinant of investment.  Cheng & Ma (2010), meanwhile, used 
a gravity model to analyze the determinants of Chinese OFDI.  They found a negative 
relationship between Chinese OFDI and target countries’ per-capita GDP, suggesting that 
Chinese FDI is more likely to flow to countries with a lower level of development (pg. 565). 
 The significance of resource endowments has continued to be disputed in further research 
on Chinese foreign investment.  Cheung & Qian (2009) used a gravity model incorporating 
country fixed effects to analyze the determinants of Chinese Outward FDI stocks and flows. 
They found that resource endowments do have a significant effect, concluding that Chinese 
OFDI is both market-seeking and resource-seeking.  Dreher & Fuchs (2011) examined the 
determinants of Chinese foreign aid, using a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood model 
designed to correct for heteroskedasticity and the large number of observations of zero in their 
data.10  They came to a conclusion similar to Buckley et al.’s (2007) regarding OFDI in that they 
                                                          
6 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares is the application of OLS to multiple independent samples drawn from the same 
population at different time periods (McManus, 2011). 
7 Generalized Least Squares (GLS) is used when the observations of the dependent variable may have unequal 
variances and/or are correlated (ie. the residuals are correlated) (Kuan, 2004).  It permits the inclusion of random 
or fixed effects in the model, and is thus extensively used in panel data analysis. 
8 Unless otherwise noted, “significant” refers to a having a coefficient that is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
9 They attribute this potentially to the low cost of capital and support of state ownership enjoyed by many Chinese 
firms, in addition to their expertise operating in emerging market economies. 
10 For a description of the Poisson Psuedo Maximum Likelihood model, see Santos Silva & Tenreyno (2006). 
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found that while political factors are a significant determinant of foreign aid, resource 
endowments are not.  Lum et al. (2009), meanwhile, using comparative data analysis, concluded 
that China’s foreign aid has been “driven primarily by Beijing’s desire to secure and transport 
natural resources and secondarily for diplomatic reasons.”  Returning to discussion of FDI, 
Kolstad & Wiig (2012) used an Ordinary Least-Squares model to examine the interaction effect 
between natural resource endowments and institutional quality.  They found that the combination 
of a target state’s large natural resource endowments and low institutional quality led to a 
positive relationship with Chinese OFDI.  
 Recognizing the ambiguity of the significance of natural resources in overall Chinese 
OFDI and foreign aid, some of the most recent research has addressed Chinese foreign 
investments that are specifically related to natural resources, especially energy.  Qian (2011) 
used a Tobit model and then the Heckman two-stage method, modeling first the investor’s choice 
of whether or not to invest and then how much to invest, to analyze the determinants of Chinese 
OFDI in oil-producing countries.  He found that while oil endowments did not predict the receipt 
of investment, there was a positive relationship between the size of oil endowments and the 
amount of investment.  The first notable empirical analysis specifically studying the 
determinants of Chinese foreign energy investments was completed by Mocker (2014).  Using 
ordered logit and Tobit regression models, she found the target country’s sovereign credit rating, 
institutional quality, and degree of oil dependence to be of positive significance for the receipt 
and amount of Chinese energy investment.  
 I add to Mocker’s work on the determinants of Chinese energy investments by 
incorporating a wider range of potential determinants as suggested by the theoretical literature on 
OFDI and Chinese foreign investments.  Whereas Mocker’s work focused heavily on risk factors 
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such as credit risks and institutional quality that might deter investors, I focus more on factors 
that attract investment, such as opportunities to seek new markets or energy resources, as 
suggested by the theoretical literature.  In my empirical methodology, I differ from her work in 
using the Heckman Selection model as opposed to multinomial logit, as well as by the inclusion 
of a 2SLS simultaneous equations model to investigate the relationship between energy 
investment and FDI.  My empirical analysis also includes a more detailed analysis of the effect 
of geographic region on energy investment, by including categorical variables for eight different 
regions rather than just a dummy variable for East Asia.  Ultimately, I do not only address the 
role of specific empirical variables in determining Chinese foreign energy investment, but also 
provide insight into which of the broader theoretical determinants of foreign investment is 
receiving the greatest weight in China’s energy investment strategies. 
 
4. Theoretical Model 
4.1  Theoretical Framework 
In constructing a theoretical model of Chinese foreign energy investments, I outline a 
theoretical framework that identifies the main possible rationales for foreign investment.  In this, 
I start with Dunning’s (1977) eclectic paradigm for OFDI and further incorporate Cai’s (1999) 
motives for Chinese OFDI specifically.11  Dunning and Cai both offer seeking new markets as 
their first motive for foreign investment.  Dunning’s second motive, efficiency and cost 
reduction, can be broken down into reducing the cost of operations and using financial capital 
efficiently, the latter of which is Cai’s fourth motive.  Cai’s second motive, seeking natural 
                                                          
11 Although I am using the theoretical background provided by the literature on OFDI specifically, my theoretical 
framework and model are designed with all foreign investment in mind, in order to cover Chinese energy investors’ 
loans and portfolio investments in addition to foreign direct investments. 
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resources, overlaps well with the strategic assets subset of Dunning’s third motive of more 
general resource-seeking.  I incorporate Cai’s third motive of seeking technology and managerial 
skills into the remainder of Dunning’s resource motive, so that the resource-seeking motive is 
divided between natural resources and more intangible resources (technology and managerial 
skills). 
I also identify a fourth major theoretical motive of building political and diplomatic 
support through foreign investment.  This motive is based on prior research including theoretical 
work by Zweig (2006) and empirical work by Dreher & Fuchs (2011) on the relevance of states’ 
institutional and cultural similarities and diplomatic relations with the investor country.  This 
theory posits that states use foreign investment to support the development of political regimes 
and institutional designs compatible with their own, both to enhance the ease with which the 
investor government and its firms can conduct business within the target states, and as a 
freestanding goal to promote the global adoption of the investor state’s political model.  They 
also use investment to support target states who will offer the investor state diplomatic support, 
in order to both support the economic development of their allies and to incentivize states to 
adopt foreign policy stances favorable to the investor state in the hope of increasing their 
probabilities of receiving investment. 
I summarize the consolidated theoretical framework as follows: 
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Table 1.1: Theoretical Framework 
 Motive 
1: Market-Seeking 
2: Efficiency/Cost Reduction 
   2a Cost Reduction 
   2b Efficient Use of Financial Capital 
3: Resource-Seeking 
   3a Natural Resource-Seeking 
   3b Technology and Managerial Skills-Seeking 
4: Political/Diplomatic Support-Building 
 
4.2  Theoretical Model 
 Based on the theoretical framework, I model the investor’s choices of whether or not to 
invest in energy in a given target country, and how much to invest.  The literature on foreign 
investment, while rich in theoretical frameworks, is lacking in formal theoretical models, so I 
will here innovate by extending my framework to a formal model.  My theoretical model will 
consist of three components: first the investor’s choice to invest in foreign energy assets, second 
the investor’s pursuit of various motives in foreign energy investment, and third the investor’s 
allocation of foreign energy investments between different countries. 
 I first consider the investors’ choice between investing in foreign energy assets and all 
other assets as a choice between two goods.  Chinese investors will choose to invest in foreign 
energy assets, here x, when the expected payoff12 of investing is greater than the payoff of 
investing in other assets, y.  Investors seek to maximize their payoffs through combining each of 
these goods in optimal amounts.  I express the investors’ payoff function as a standard Cobb-
Douglas function, assuming convex preferences: 
𝑃𝐼 = 𝑥𝛼𝑦(1−𝛼) 
                                                          
12 Here, I use “payoff” not to describe the monetary profit of an investment, but to describe its total benefits to the 
investor, in a sense similar to utility. 
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Where 𝛼 is a value between 1 and 0, and 𝛼 and 1 − 𝛼 represent the payoff weightings placed on 
energy assets x and all other assets y, respectively. 
 The investors’ optimal payoff is constrained by their budget: the availability of funds 
with which to make investments.  Given a set amount of funds I, the investors must choose how 
to allocate these funds between investments in energy assets and all other assets: 
𝐼 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 
The payoff-maximizing point can therefore be found at the point where, for a given I, the budget 
constraint is tangent to the outermost attainable payoff function, shown as point E: 
Figure 2.1: Payoff Maximization between Investment Categories 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, I examine investors’ pursuit of different sources of payoffs within foreign energy 
assets.  My theoretical framework identified four main motives for Chinese foreign energy 
investors: market access, efficiency/cost-reduction, access to resources, and political/diplomatic 
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support.  Hence, I consider investment in foreign energy assets as the sum of investments 
targeting each of these four motives: 
𝑥 = 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 +  𝑥3 + 𝑥4 
Where 𝑥1 represents investments seeking market access, 𝑥2 represents investments seeking 
efficiency and cost reductions, 𝑥3 represents investment seeking access to resources, and 𝑥4 
represents investment seeking political support. 
 Investors seek the combination of these four sub-categories of foreign energy investment 
that will maximize their total payoff.  I thus incorporate each sub-category into a Cobb-Douglas 
framework in order to specify the investor’s total payoff: 
𝑃𝑥 = 𝑥1
𝛼1𝑥2
𝛼2𝑥3
𝛼3𝑥4
(1−𝛼1−𝛼2−𝛼3) 
Where 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3, and 1 − 𝛼1 − 𝛼2 − 𝛼3 represent the payoff weightings placed on investing in 
market access, efficiency/cost-reduction, resource access, and political support, respectively. 
 This payoff function is constrained by the investor’s total budget for foreign energy 
investments as previously specified, which must be allocated between investments pursuing each 
of the theoretical motives for foreign energy investment: 
𝑥 = 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 + 𝑥4 
For any two of these four types of foreign energy investment, while holding the other two 
constant, the payoff-maximizing point can again be found where the payoff function is tangent to 
the budget line, here at point E’: 
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Figure 2.2: Payoff Maximization between Energy Investment Motives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(At constant x2 and x4) 
 
Third, I consider how investors decide how much to invest in energy assets in each 
country.  Energy investment in each country will yield different balances of the payoff sources of 
market access, efficiency/cost-reductions, resource access, and political support, depending on 
the characteristics of each country and its energy assets.  An investment of one billion dollars in 
energy assets in one country may achieve massive cost reductions but provide little access to 
energy resources, while that same investment in another country may yield few cost benefits but 
provide access to vast amounts of energy resources.  Investments at different time periods may 
also yield different balances of the payoff sources, depending on changes in factors such as 
country policy and global energy markets.  Accordingly, I consider the actual attainment of the 
four identified motives of foreign energy investment as varying at the country and time level: 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 → 𝑀𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑆𝑖𝑡 
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Where 𝑀 represents market access, 𝐶 represents efficiency/cost-reductions, 𝑅 represents 
resource access, and 𝑆 is political support, in country i at time t.  Here, the variables , 𝐶, 𝑅, and 𝑆 
represent the investment’s actual payoff to the motives they represent, not simply the dollar 
value invested seeking each of these motives as 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, and 𝑥4 represent. 
 The total payoff to the investor for a given time period, therefore, is the aggregate payoff 
from each of these four motives for foreign energy investment across all countries in that time 
period: 
𝑃𝑡
𝑥 = ∑(𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 The actual contributions of the investments to the four motives within each country and 
time period obviously do not match precisely with the dollar values invested seeking each of 
these motives.  The hypothetical one billion dollars invested in energy assets in a country could 
plausibly contribute to all four motives; it is less conceivable that one-fourth of that billion could 
be invested specifically seeking market access while the other fourths could be invested seeking 
specifically each of the other motives.  Thus, while I theorize about how investors allocate their 
funds across investments targeting their four motives at the global level, I cannot as simply 
model how investors target each of these motives at the country level.  As such, my empirical 
model uses explanatory variables that proxy these four payoff sources to estimate how investors 
allocate their investment funds across these payoff sources at the country level. 
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5. Empirical Model 
5.1  Hypotheses 
I formulate hypotheses that use empirical proxies to indicate the significance of each of 
the motives for investment identified in the theoretical model.  I first consider a null hypothesis 
where Chinese foreign energy investments are allocated randomly, or only by reference to 
geographic region or a time trend.  I then seek to reject this null hypothesis in favor of each 
alternative hypothesis, which is proposed based on the theoretical model. 
Hypothesis 1: Countries with higher gross domestic products (GDP) will receive higher levels of 
Chinese energy investment.13 
Hypothesis 2a: Countries with higher levels of oil production will receive higher levels of 
Chinese energy investment. 
Hypothesis 2b: Countries with higher levels of natural gas production will receive higher levels 
of Chinese energy investment. 
These hypotheses address the market-seeking component of my theoretical model.  As Gross 
Domestic Product describes a country’s total market size, its significance would suggest Chinese 
energy investors are market-seeking in that they target larger overall markets, capable of 
generating greater revenues for the investors.  Production of oil and natural gas, which refers to 
the current volumes of oil and natural gas being produced in a country, serve as proxies for the 
current size of a country’s energy market.  Their significance would indicate that investors are 
market-seeking with a more specific focus on the energy market by targeting countries with 
larger energy markets. 
                                                          
13 Can also be expressed as “will be more likely to receive Chinese energy investment,” in reference to the binary 
dependent variable of whether or not investment was received.  This pattern follows for each hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 3: Countries with higher levels of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
will receive higher levels of Chinese energy investments 
This hypothesis also relates to the market-seeking motive in the theoretical model.  It proposes 
that investors will target countries that receive higher levels of overall Chinese FDI as these 
markets are already being developed by other Chinese firms and thus will be easier for Chinese 
energy investors to gain a market presence.  It proposes that Chinese energy investors do not 
only pursue larger markets for their own operations, but may cooperate with Chinese firms of 
other industries to seek out new markets for Chinese firms of all industries. 
Hypothesis 4: Countries with higher GDP growth rates will receive higher levels of Chinese 
energy investment. 
Hypothesis 5: The lower the rate of China’s GDP growth, the higher the level of foreign energy 
investment will be. 
These hypotheses both address the efficiency/cost-reduction motive, seeking to proxy the 
efficient use of financial capital.  Hypothesis 4, also considered by Qian (2011), proposes that 
investors seek to enhance the efficiency of their capital by deploying it rapidly-growing markets 
where expected returns are greater.  Along these same lines, Hypothesis 5 addresses the 
competition from domestic investment as discussed in the theoretical model.  It posits that if the 
prospects for domestic investment are less attractive as indicated by China’s GDP growth, 
investors will seek to more efficiently allocate their capital by shifting funds to foreign energy 
investments.14 
                                                          
14 At the same time, I recognize that the relationship between China’s economic growth and foreign investments 
could plausibly run the other way: higher economic growth in China would increase the availability of funds for 
foreign investments.  However, I hypothesize that there is a negative relationship due to what the efficient use of 
financial capital motive suggests: that investors will pursue foreign investment if its expected returns are greater 
than domestic investment, which would more likely be the case if China’s economic growth was slowing. 
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Hypothesis 6: Countries with lower per-capita GDP will receive higher levels of Chinese energy 
investments 
This hypothesis also addresses the efficiency/cost-reduction component of the theoretical model, 
by specifically addressing the cost reduction side.  It proposes that as investors can conceivably 
operate with lower costs in less-developed economies where the costs of labor, natural resources, 
and other factors of production will presumably be lower, they will prefer to invest in less-
developed economies as indicated by lower per-capita GDP.  This hypothesis was similarly 
considered by Cheng & Ma (2010) to investigate if Chinese investors have a preference for 
developing countries. 
Hypothesis 7a: Countries with higher proven oil reserves will receive higher levels of Chinese 
energy investments 
Hypothesis 7b: Countries with higher proven natural gas reserves will receive higher levels of 
Chinese energy investments 
Hypothesis 8: Countries with a larger presence of non-Chinese International Oil Companies 
(IOCs) will receive higher levels of Chinese energy investment 
Hypothesis 9: The higher the global market price of oil, the higher the level of Chinese foreign 
energy investment. 
These hypotheses relate to the resource-seeking component of the theoretical model, specifically 
access to energy resources.  A focus on targets with large oil and gas reserves rather than simply 
high production; that is, with high long-term if not current potential to supply energy resources, 
would indicate that investors are seeking to secure long-term sources of energy supplies for 
China.  Likewise, a preference for countries whose energy resources are the subject of existing 
claims by non-Chinese IOCs would suggest that investors intend to compete with other nations’ 
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energy firms for access to energy resources.  Finally, as China’s energy insecurity would be 
enhanced by a rise in global energy prices (which could constitute an adverse supply shock), 
Hypothesis 9 posits that China’s efforts to secure access to energy resources will be more urgent 
if the global price of oil15 is seen to be rising.16 
Hypothesis 10: Countries with scores on the Polity IV index closer to China’s score will receive 
higher levels of Chinese energy investment 
Hypothesis 11: Countries that are engaged in arms trade17 with China will receive higher levels 
of Chinese energy investment 
These hypotheses both relate to the fourth component of the theoretical model: building political 
support as a motive for investment.  A focus on countries with similar political systems to China 
as indicated by the Polity IV score, which scores countries’ political systems on a scale from 
fully democratic to fully autocratic, would indicate the use of energy investments to build 
political support for China in countries with compatible political systems, or perhaps to support 
allies who share China’s model of governance.18  A focus on countries with close diplomatic and 
security relations with China as indicated by arms trade would suggest a relationship between 
economic cooperation through energy investments and security cooperation through arms trade, 
whereby China uses its economic influence to advance its security influence.19 
                                                          
15 The price of oil alone, rather than the prices of oil and natural gas, was used because oil prices are more 
standardized than natural gas prices (for reasons such as different prices for liquefied natural gas). 
16 It is also plausible that a relationship between energy investments and the price of oil would indicate a market-
seeking motive, as the potential revenues to be generated from global energy markets would be higher if the price 
of oil is rising. 
17 Including both the sale of arms to China and the purchase of arms from China. 
18 The Polity IV score is also used by Mocker (2014) as a measure of institutional quality, where she hypothesized 
that Chinese energy investment would follow more democratic states due to their higher institutional quality.  I 
question this assumption that Chinese investment follows high-quality democratic institutions, and instead 
propose instead that Chinese investors will prefer institutions that are compatible with their own. 
19 An analogous relationship between Chinese arms trade and foreign aid was investigated by Wang et al (2013) 
and Dreher et al (2014). 
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5.2  Empirical Model 
Using these hypotheses, I construct an empirical model to analyze two primary dependent 
variables: the binary variable of whether or not a country received energy investment, and the 
continuous variable of how much energy investment was received.  I consider the effect of the 
hypotheses on each dependent variable separately, as following Qian (2011, pg. 15), I recognize 
that the determinants of the decision to invest are not necessarily the same as the determinants of 
how much to invest.  My unit of observation is each country in a given year.20  I take Qian’s 
(2011) approach of beginning with a Tobit model before moving to a two-stage Heckman 
Selection model.  I then proceed to use a 2SLS simultaneous equations model to analyze the 
relationship between the dependent variable of how much investment was received and the 
potentially endogenous explanatory variable of Chinese OFDI. 
The Tobit model, which censors observations of the dependent variable at zero from 
below, is used to provide a preliminary analysis of the determinants of how much to invest.  The 
two stages of the Heckman Selection model allow me to separately consider the decisions of 
whether or not to invest and how much to invest.  By including a non-selection hazard as an 
explanatory variable in the second stage, it allows for the analysis of the decision of how much to 
invest while holding constant for the factors that affect the selection of which countries receive 
investment in the first place.  My simultaneous equations model, for which I use a Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) approach, investigates the two-way relationship between foreign energy 
investment and OFDI by simultaneously estimating models where each dependent variable 
serves as an explanatory variable for the other model. 
                                                          
20 The decision to use the country rather than the firm as the unit of observation is because a large number of 
these investments are made directly to a country’s government or to state-owned energy firms.  My hypotheses 
also demonstrate more interest in the conditions of the target countries rather than the target firms. 
33 
 
5.2.1 Tobit Model with Random Effects 
In order to provide an initial analysis of which countries receive energy investment, I first 
use a Tobit model with random effects, with the continuous variable of the amount of investment 
as the dependent variable.  In applying the Tobit model, I censor the observed values of the 
dependent variable at zero from below, using the process specified by Tobin (1958).  Given that 
most observations of the dependent variable are zero—cases where no investment was 
received—this prevents the downward bias that may result from using Ordinary Least Squares or 
Generalized Least Squares.  I specify the inclusion of random effects by target country in the 
model given the panel nature of the data. 
Equation 1.1: Tobit Model with Random Effects 
ln (𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝐵5𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6𝑟𝑖                      
+ 𝛽7𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Here, 𝐸𝐼 represents total Chinese energy investment received by a country in a given 
year, in millions of US Dollars.  𝑀 is a vector for market-seeking factors, and includes the 
natural logs of GDP, both oil and natural gas production, and Chinese OFDI.  𝐶 is the vector for 
efficiency/cost-reduction factors, and includes the country’s real GDP growth rate, China’s GDP 
growth rate, and the natural log of the country’s per-capita GDP.  𝑅 is the vector for resource 
access variables, including the natural logs of oil and natural gas reserves, the number of oil and 
gas “supermajors” with significant operations in that country in that year, and the global market 
price of Brent crude oil.21 22  The supermajors detailed are Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, Conoco-
Phillips, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, and Total.  𝑆 is the vector for political support, including both 
                                                          
21 China’s GDP growth rate and the Brent crude price vary only by year t, not by country i (see Appendix A). 
22 The Brent crude price, based in the European market, was used rather than West Texas Intermediate (WTI) as it 
is a better representation of the global market price of oil, being that Brent crude is generally traded globally by 
sea rather than land like WTI (EIA, “Europe Brent Spot Price FOB,” 2015). 
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the difference in the country’s Polity IV score from China’s score, and a binary variable for 
whether or not arms trade with China was engaged in in that year, including both arms sales to 
China and purchases from China.  The expanded specification of this equation can be found in 
Appendix A. 
𝐷 represents a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if Chinese OFDI is observed and 0 
if it is missing.  Except for Chinese OFDI, other variables are available for a large number of 
countries (on average, 149 countries per year), with 2080 observations in the estimation 
sample.23  Chinese OFDI, however, is missing in 56 percent of the estimation sample.  Analyzing 
this data as reported would result in a highly constrained number of observations, and produce 
results possibly biased by the sample selection.  I address this problem by using the dummy 
variable adjustment approach as described by Cohen et al. (2003).  This approach entails creating 
a dummy variable to indicate available values in the OFDI variable, and replacing the missing 
values for OFDI with zeros, instead of dropping these observations entirely.  As an alternative 
specification, I re-estimate equation (1.1) only for the sample of 1162 observations where 
Chinese OFDI was originally observed. 
 𝑟 expresses a categorical variable for geographic region.  Each of the eight regions—East 
& Southeast Asia, Africa, Central Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, 
and Oceania—was assigned a value between 1 and 8.  As China’s own region, East & Southeast 
Asia was assigned the value of 1 to serve as the baseline region for the variable.  𝑇 is a vector for 
both the time trend and the time trend squared.  Finally, 𝑣 represents the country random effects, 
and 𝜀 expresses the error term for the model. 
                                                          
23 See Summary Statistics in Section 7. 
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The lagged values (t – 1) are used for all non-time and non-geography explanatory 
variables, as the investors will be making their decisions to invest in time t with t – 1 being the 
most recent period for which data on the various explanatory variables is available. 
5.2.2 Heckman Selection Model 
The Tobit model deals with the fact that only a minority of country-year dyads received 
Chinese energy investment by censoring the other values where no investment was observed 
from the estimation.  However, I assume that the selection of which values are observed is non-
random, as this represents the investors’ choice of which countries to grant investment to.  
Accordingly, the Tobit estimation results may be biased by failing to take into account the 
determinants of why the observed values of investment were selected in the first place.  To 
account for this, I use the Heckman two-stage model.  Heckman’s (1979) model allows for the 
analysis of a dependent variable where the selection of the dependent variable is not random.  
Given that my data is in panel data format, I will again follow Qian (2011) in using 
Wooldridge’s (1995) process to tailor the Heckman model to panel data analysis, by 
incorporating random effects at both stages. 
The first stage of the Heckman two-stage uses a Probit estimation to analyze the factors 
that determine the observation of the dependent variable.  To tailor the model to my panel data, I 
include random effects in the estimation.  In addition to reporting the determinants of the 
selection of the dependent variable, this model also generates an inverse Mills ratio, which serves 
as the non-selection hazard variable used in the second stage of the model. 
All explanatory variables included in the first stage of the model are also included in the 
second stage of the model, with the exception of the binary variable for arms trade, which is not 
included in the second stage in order to achieve identification of the model.  Arms trade was 
36 
 
excluded from the second stage on the rationale that as a binary variable, its main impact would 
be on the first stage of decision making, where simply a binary decision of whether or not to 
invest is being made.  This expectation was borne out by testing: when included in both models 
(with other variables excluded from the second stage) arms trade was highly significant in the 
first stage and not significant in the second stage.  Accordingly, it is an appropriate variable to 
serve as an instrument for the first stage of the model. 
Equation 2.1: First Stage of Heckman Selection Model 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾2𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾3𝑅𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾4𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾5𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾6𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾7𝑟𝑖      
+ 𝛾8𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝐼𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether or not investment was observed.  The 
explanatory variables used for this first stage model are the same as those used previously for the 
Tobit model.  A represents the variable for arms trade, and is specified separately from the S 
vector here because it is not included in the second stage of the Heckman model, in order to 
achieve identification of the first stage of the model. 
 The second stage of the Heckman model normally uses an Ordinary Least-Squares 
regression to analyze the effect of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable for those 
values for which the dependent variable is observed.  Using the Wooldridge (1995) 
customization process, I instead use a Generalized Least-Squares (GLS) estimation with random 
effects for panel data.  In this case, it analyzes the effects of the explanatory variables on the 
amount of investment received for the country-year dyads for which investment was received.   
Equation 2.2: Second Stage of Heckman Selection Model 
ln (𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿2𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿3𝑅𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿4𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿5𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿6𝑟𝑖                        
+ 𝛿7𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿8𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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Where 𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the value of total investment.  The equation is estimated only for observations of 
𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡 greater than zero, and 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the inverse Mills ratio (non-selection hazard). 
5.2.3 Simultaneous Equations 
 One of the explanatory variables in the prior models, Chinese Outward FDI, has the 
dubious distinction of being a likely endogenous variable.  It is not only a possible determinant 
of the dependent variable of Chinese foreign energy investment, but also a dependent variable in 
its own right which might be endogenous to energy investments, as the majority of energy 
investments in this study are a component of FDI.  Overall Chinese FDI might follow energy 
investments as they provide access to new markets, just as energy investments might follow 
overall FDI for the same reason.  Moreover, as discussed in the theoretical model, overall FDI 
includes all non-energy investments which compete with energy investments, and funds are 
presumably allocated to each asset class simultaneously.  Accordingly, it is necessary to estimate 
simultaneous equations of the determinants of both Chinese energy investments and Chinese 
Outward FDI. 
 To do so, I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation.  This process estimates two 
equations simultaneously, where the dependent variable in the first equation serves as an 
explanatory variable for the dependent variable in the second equation, which itself is an 
explanatory variable in the first equation.   A 2SLS model also includes exogenous variables 
which serve as explanatory variables for both equations, and separate exogenous variables which 
each serve as explanatory variables for one of the two equations.  These exogenous variables 
which are only explanatory variables for one of the two dependent variables serve as 
instrumental variables for their respective dependent variables.  In its simplest description, a 
2SLS estimation takes the following form: 
38 
 
𝑦1 = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛼1𝑥1 + 𝛼2𝑦2 + 𝛼3𝑥2 + 𝜀;  𝑦2 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑦1 + 𝛽3𝑥3 + 𝑣 
Where 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 are the two dependent variables, 𝑥1 is an exogenous variable for each equation, 
and 𝑥2 and 𝑥3 are exogenous variables for 𝑦1 and 𝑦2, respectively.
24 
In my estimations, the amount of Chinese energy investment and Outward FDI are the 
two dependent variables, which are each explanatory variables for each other.  My equations for 
the simultaneous determination of these two categories of investment are as follows: 
Equation 3.1: GLS Estimation of Total Energy Investment for Simultaneous Equations 
ln(𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼2ln (𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛼3𝐼𝑂𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼4𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛼5ln (𝑂𝑅𝑖(𝑡−1))
+ 𝛼6ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼7𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Equation 3.2: GLS Estimation of FDI for Simultaneous Equations 
ln(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜃2ln (𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝜃3𝐼𝑂𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜃4𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜃5ln (𝐸𝑖(𝑡−1))  
+ 𝜃6ln(𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝜃7𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 𝐺𝐷𝑃 represents the vector of the natural log of real GDP and the GDP growth rate, while 
𝑃𝐶 is per-capita GDP.  𝑆 is again the vector of political support variables, the Polity IV score 
difference with China and the presence of arms trade with China.  𝐼𝑂𝐶 is the variable for the 
number of oil supermajors present.  𝑂𝑅, meanwhile, represents oil reserves.  It is used as the 
instrumental variable for total energy investment, as oil reserves are an energy resource that, 
based on the theoretical model, energy investment will seek access to, but not overall investment.  
𝐸 is Chinese exports to the country, and is used as the instrumental variable for FDI as the 
theoretical literature proposes that FDI seeks to develop export markets, but my own theoretical 
                                                          
24 Presentation based on StataCorp (2011, pg. 2074).  Note that this is only an example of a generic 2SLS model, 
not a specification of an equation I use in this thesis. 
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model has not proposed this as a motivation for specifically energy investment.25  The other 
explanatory variables are all exogenous variables to both of the dependent variables in the 
equations. 
 It should be noted here that the goal of the estimation in Equation 3.2 is not to provide a 
comprehensive model for the determination of FDI; that is beyond the scope of this thesis and 
already the subject of extensive prior research.  Instead, it is simply to allow for an analysis of 
the determination of energy investment while holding constant for the determination of FDI.  As 
these two categories of investment are endogenous to each other, it is only possible to examine 
the nature of their two-way relationship by running models for each category of investment 
simultaneously where each serves as an explanatory variable for the other. 
 
6. Data Sources 
6.1  Dependent Variables 
My primary data sources on Chinese energy equity investments are the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation’s China Global Investment Tracker, and 
Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum database, following Mocker (2014).  The AEI and Heritage 
Foundation database provides a comprehensive listing of all Chinese foreign direct investments 
in amounts of $100 million or greater since 2005, and can be sorted by sector and subsector to 
identify oil and gas investments.  For each investment, it identifies the month and year, U.S. 
Dollar amount, investor, target/recipient, country, region, and percentage stake acquired if an 
equity share was acquired.  In order to include deals of less than $100m and deals from 2001 
                                                          
25 The appropriateness of the instrumental variables was tested by separately regressing each dependent variable 
on each proposed instrumental variable, in the context of the proposed simultaneous equations models.  Each was 
found to be significant only for the dependent variable which it serves as an instrument for. 
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through 2004, I have supplemented this database with Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum database 
on M&A deals, provided through the UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School.  This database also 
provides detail on the month and year of the investment, the U.S. Dollar amount, the investor and 
the target, and the percentage stake acquired.  For the sovereign wealth funds, which often 
engage in portfolio investments that are not publicly reported in addition to M&A activity, I have 
supplemented the AEI and Heritage data with secondary sources, including Martin (2010) and 
Sun et al. (2014)’s studies of China’s sovereign wealth funds’ investments. 
Loans, like the sovereign wealth fund investments, proved more problematic as they are 
not always publicly reported by the Chinese banks issuing them, and no comprehensive database 
on these loans is available.  Instead, I have constructed my own listing of Chinese energy loans 
using the loans detailed in secondary sources.  Downs’ (2011) detailed study on the China 
Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank’s large scale Energy-Backed Loans issues 
has proven particularly helpful. 
6.2  Explanatory Variables 
 For energy data, namely the data on production and proved reserves of oil and natural 
gas, I use the International Energy Statistics database of the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA).  This database lists oil and natural gas production and proved reserves for 
all countries and regions for each year from 1980 to 2014.  I also use the EIA’s website to 
provide the annual averages for the price of Brent crude oil.  For the IOC variable on the 
presence of international oil companies, I have examined the annual reports to the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission of each of six oil & gas “supermajors” (Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, 
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ConocoPhillips, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and Total)26 for each of the given years, and listed all 
countries that those reports detail a significant production presence in.27  I then compiled this 
data to list the total number of supermajors with significant operations in each country in each 
year. 
 International trade-related data includes Chinese Exports and Chinese Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment.  Trade data on Chinese Exports have come from the World Bank’s 
international trade statistics in the World Integrated Trade Solutions database.  The sources for 
Chinese OFDI are the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s 
annual statistics on bilateral FDI, detailing FDI flows from China to each country in U.S. 
Dollars, and the National Bureau of Statistics of China’s China Statistical Yearbook, used for 
2013 for which the UNCTAD data was not available.  These sources have all been used 
extensively by the existing literature on Chinese FDI.  For the required general economic data, 
namely Gross Domestic Product, per-capital GDP, and real GDP growth, I use the World Bank’s 
annual statistics on current real GDP and per-capita GDP, in U.S. dollars. 
 For political/diplomatic factors, I proxy the similarity of each country’s political system 
to China’s, and whether or not they have a close diplomatic and security relationship.  For 
political similarities, I use the Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV dataset, from the Center’s 
Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research database.  This dataset lists all independent 
states with a population of 500,000 or greater for each year since 1800.  It assigns each state in 
                                                          
26 For U.S. firms (Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips), this was the 10-K report; for European firms (BP, 
Shell, and Total), this was the 20-F report. 
27 The supermajors’ presence proved to be one of the most difficult elements of data collection, as their methods 
of reporting their countries of operation varied between reports, even within the same firm.  Where possible, I 
have listed only countries where the given firm engaged in production of oil and/or natural gas in that given year.  
In some cases, however, the reports did not explicitly detail volumes of oil and gas production by country.  In those 
cases, I instead relied on their summaries of acreage terms by country, detailing in which countries they hold 
production concessions. 
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each year a “polity” score based on the characteristics of its government and political system, 
ranging from fully autocratic with a score of -10 to fully democratic with a score of 10.  My 
variable is the difference in each state’s polity score with China’s score in each year, in order to 
proxy for the similarity of each state’s political system to China’s. 
To proxy for a strong security relationship with China, I created a binary variable of 
whether or not a state engaged in arms sales with China in a given year.  This variable is coded 1 
if the state either placed orders for arms with China or received shipments of arms from China in 
that year, or if China placed arms orders or received shipments from that state, and 0 otherwise.  
My data on arms sales is from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 
Arms Transfers Database.  This database enables the user to generate a register of all arms trade 
between given sets of recipients and providers for a defined time period.  The register lists each 
arms deal individually, defining the recipient and the provider, the name of the weapons system, 
and the years in which orders were placed and shipments were made.  I generated registers of all 
arms deals with China as a recipient or as a provider for all years from 2000 to 2014. 
 Finally, for the categorical variable for geographic region, I encoded the initial string 
variable as a numerical variable in Stata, where a numerical value between 1 and 8 represents 
each geographic region.  These regions are East and Southeast Asia (including India), North 
America, Latin America, Europe, Central Asia (including Russia), the Middle East, Africa, and 
Oceania.  The base group, with the value of 1, is countries in China’s own region of East and 
Southeast Asia.  These geographic variables are included in order to test if investments are 
weighted towards or against any particular geographic regions.  They are also used to perform 
separate estimations for each geographic region to study the determinants of investment within 
each region. 
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7. Summary Statistics 
7.1 Dependent Variables 
The summary statistics provided in Table 2.1 cover the main dependent variables of 
Chinese foreign energy investment by country from the period 2001 to 2014.  The two listings 
for the main dependent variables are invest, which is a binary variable of whether or not 
investment was received, and tot_invest, which is the amount of investment in that year in 
millions of U.S. Dollars.  They also cover data for the subsidiary dependent variables, energy 
investments divided by type of investment (loans and equity) and by type of investor (national 
oil company v. policy bank v. sovereign wealth fund).  Only the observations included within the 
estimation sample of the main Tobit and Heckman models are detailed.  Separate observations 
are listed for each country for each year: 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables 
 
It should be noted that each unit of the variable refers to the total amount of energy 
investment in a country in a given year, not the value of a single investment/deal.  For example, 
the largest value for tot_invest of $25,300 million is the largest amount of investment granted to 
any country in a single year, in this case Russia in 2009, through multiple individual investments.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES LABELS N mean sd max min
invest =1 if energy investment made 2,080 0.0726 0.260 1 0
loans =1 if loans made 2,080 0.00962 0.0976 1 0
tot_loans Loans in mill ions USD 2,080 49.74 808.2 25,000 0
equity =1 if equity investment made 2,080 0.0678 0.251 1 0
tot_equity Equity investment in mill ions USD 2,080 117.3 742.0 20,790 0
policy_bank =1 if policy bank investment made 2,080 0.0101 0.1000 1 0
tot_pol_bank Policy bank investment in mill ions USD 2,080 50.32 809.0 25,000 0
noc =1 if national oil  company investment made 2,080 0.0490 0.216 1 0
tot_noc National oil  company investment in mill ions USD 2,080 93.29 686.8 20,790 0
sov_wealth =1 if sovereign wealth fund investment made 2,080 0.00577 0.0758 1 0
tot_sov_wealth Sovereign wealth fund investments in mill ions USD 2,080 8.846 137.1 3,240 0
tot_invest Energy investment in mill ions USD 2,080 167.1 1,122 25,300 0
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Insight into the total values of the various categories of Chinese energy investment, by 
type of investment and by type of investor, is provided in the figures below: 
Figure 3.1: Chinese Foreign Energy Investment by Type of Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Chinese Foreign Energy Investment by Type of Investor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the period covered, there has been an unmistakable time trend in both the volume and 
distribution of Chinese foreign energy investments.  For the first decade, energy investment grew 
rapidly, with an especially large spike in 2009, after the global financial crisis.  Mocker’s (2014) 
work in fact found that a post-financial crisis timing was a significant determinant of energy 
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investment.  However, investment thereafter leveled off, and in fact since 2012 has been in 
decline. 
Figure 3.3: China’s Foreign Energy Investment by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Targets of Chinese Foreign Energy Investment by Year 
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China’s energy investment has been widely distributed geographically, but by far the 
largest shares have gone to Latin America and Central Asia (including Russia): 
Figure 3.5: Chinese Energy Investment by Geographic Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In examining the most popular destinations for Chinese energy investment by country, 
they are all large energy producing countries, but beyond that are a more diverse batch of 
countries.  They are geographically diversified in six continents, include both developing and 
developed nations, and politically include both “petro-dictatorships” such as Iran, Nigeria, and 
Venezuela, and western democracies such as Canada and the United States.  However, the two 
largest target countries, Venezuela and Russia, are unmistakably close political allies of China on 
the world stage. 
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Figure 3.6: China’s Largest Foreign Energy Investment Targets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2 Explanatory Variables 
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables are detailed below.  For ease of 
description and interpretation, they are listed in their raw values, even though it is the natural log 
of many that is actually used in the estimations.  Because both lagged and current values of the 
explanatory variables are used in certain cases,28 observations are listed from the years 2000 to 
2014, again limiting observations to those included in the estimation sample.  The summary 
statistics for OFDI are shown with the orginal number of missing values for the variable, before 
those missing values were replaced with zeros as per the dummy variable adjustment process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Current values being used for Chinese OFDI in the simultaneous equations estimation. 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
 
 
 
8. Results 
8.1 Tobit Model with Random Effects Results 
First, using a Tobit model with random effects, I estimate the effect of the explanatory 
variables on the determination of the value of Chinese energy investment granted to each country 
in each year.  A separate estimation (Column 1) was performed without the inclusion of the 
dummy variable used to control for missing values of Chinese OFDI, using only the originally 
reported observations of the explanatory variables.  The main model with the inclusion of the 
dummy variable is reported in Column 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES LABELS N mean sd max min
per_cap Per-capita Gross Domestic Product in US Dollars 2,070 11,051 17,107 113,732 106
gdp Gross Domestic Product in US Dollars 2,070 3.349e+11 1.303e+12 1.742e+13 2.201e+08
gdp_growth Real GDP growth rate in % 2,080 4.134 5.369 104.5 -62.08
fdi Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment in mill ions of US Dollars 1,215 108.9 399.5 4,808 -814.9
oil_res Oil reserves in bill ions of barrels 2,078 8.330 33.01 297.7 0
gas_res Gas reserves in tril l ions of cubic feet 2,075 40.69 176.5 1,700 0
oil_prod Oil production in thousands of barrels per day 2,080 523.2 1,577 13,973 -0.840
gas_prod Gas production in bill ions of cubic feet per year 1,967 702.1 2,610 25,728 0
polity Polity Score Difference with China 2,076 10.91 6.251 17 -3
ioc Number of oil  supermajors present 2,080 0.889 1.593 6 0
arms =1 if arms deals made with China 2,080 0.152 0.359 1 0
brent Annual average Brent crude oil price in US Dollars 2,080 70.13 31.28 111.6 24.46
china_growth China's Real GDP growth rate in % 2,080 9.819 1.873 14.19 7.350
trend Time Trend 2,080 8.537 4.026 15 2
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Table 3.1: Tobit Model with Random Effects Results 
 
 
(1) (2)
limited full
VARIABLES LABELS Log of Investment (USD MM) Log of Investment (USD MM)
2.region Africa 1.576 0.343
(1.944) (1.885)
3.region Central Asia 7.070*** 7.655***
(2.417) (2.309)
4.region Europe 0.637 -0.700
(2.800) (2.540)
5.region Latin America 5.186** 3.893*
(2.405) (2.121)
6.region Middle East 2.279 1.077
(2.706) (2.468)
7.region North America 5.520 4.873
(3.427) (3.394)
8.region Oceania 10.655*** 6.874**
(3.211) (3.109)
l_lngdp Natural Log of Real GDP (t-1) 2.446*** 1.831***
(0.723) (0.587)
l_lnoil_prod Natural Log of Oil Production (t-1) 0.140 0.678
(0.452) (0.415)
l_lngas_prod Natural Log of Gas Production (t-1) -0.498 -0.384
(0.444) (0.411)
l_lnfdi Natural Log of Chinese Outward FDI (t-1) 0.147 0.223
(0.402) (0.340)
dl_lnfdi =1 if Log of lagged FDI is observed 2.233
(1.583)
l_growth GDP Growth (t-1) 0.226* 0.109
(0.127) (0.076)
l_china_growth China's GDP Growth (t-1) -0.445 -0.537
(0.438) (0.388)
l_lnper_cap Natural Log of Per-Capita GDP (t-1) -2.306*** -2.051***
(0.715) (0.629)
l_lnoil_res Natural Log of Oil Reserves (t-1) 2.275*** 1.298*
(0.754) (0.687)
l_lngas_res Natural Log of Gas Reserves (t-1) -0.952 -0.460
(0.766) (0.717)
l_ioc Number of international oil  companies present (t-1) 1.755*** 1.581***
(0.415) (0.382)
l_brent Annual average Brent crude oil  price in US Dollars (t-1) 0.038 0.065*
(0.044) (0.038)
l_polity Polity Score Difference with China (t-1) -0.198 -0.137
(0.132) (0.114)
l_arms =1 if arms deal made with China (t-1) 3.371*** 3.926***
(1.295) (1.186)
trend Time Trend 2.974* 2.951***
(1.736) (1.051)
trend2 Time Trend Squared -0.132 -0.148***
(0.086) (0.056)
Constant Constant -73.197*** -61.210***
(17.023) (13.325)
Observations 1,162 2,080
Number of country 124 155
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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 Referring to the main model (Column 2), the results of the Tobit model are generally in 
line with my hypotheses, from all of the major motives identified in the theoretical model.  For 
the market-seeking vector, the coefficient on GDP is of high positive significance at the 1% 
level.  Oil and natural gas production and Chinese OFDI, on the other hand, are not significant.  
This provides confirmation that Chinese energy investors will if nothing else follow the 
availability of new markets.  The especially strong significance of GDP, rather than specifically 
oil or gas production, suggests that investors prefer larger overall markets while holding the level 
of energy production constant.  The lack of significance of FDI, on the other hand, implies that 
energy investors are not necessarily acting in coordination with other types of Chinese investors 
to develop new markets. 
 Regarding the efficiency/cost-reduction vector, the cost-reduction sub-component of the 
theoretical framework is given more credence by the results than the efficiency component.    
The coefficient on per-capita GDP is highly negatively significant, at the 1% level.  This finding 
supports the cost reduction hypothesis, by implying that Chinese energy investors prefer to 
operate in poorer, developing countries, where the costs of the factors of production—labor, land 
(including energy resources) and capital—are lower.  Here, it matches the results of Cheng & Ma 
(2010) and Qian (2011), who found that per-capita GDP is of negative significance for Chinese 
OFDI globally and in oil-producing nations, respectively.  GDP growth and China’s GDP growth 
rate, however, are not significant.  Investors do not appear to be attempting to target faster-
growing markets, or diversifying away from a slowing Chinese market, to more efficiently 
deploy their capital.  Instead, their pursuit of commercial motives is mainly captured by the GDP 
and per-capita GDP variables.  These variables indicate that investors seek profit through both 
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cost reductions and revenue enhancements, targeting countries with large overall markets 
capable of generating revenues yet with low costs for the investor firms. 
 Regarding the pursuit of energy resources, the level of oil reserves is found to be a 
significant positive determinant of energy investment, at the 10% level, while gas reserves were 
not significant.  The fact that Chinese investors target oil rather than natural gas was also found 
by Mocker (2014), although she used oil and gas rents as a share of GDP rather than reserves as 
her explanatory variables.  The presence of western oil and gas supermajors was of stronger 
positive significance, at the 1% level.  This remained the case when including in a separate 
estimation a variable for a country’s stock of non-Chinese Inward FDI, as Qian (2011) did, to 
determine the effect of the presence of the supermajors while holding constant for the country’s 
overall attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment.  This finding supports the resource-
seeking motive by suggesting that Chinese energy investors are in direct competition with 
western energy firms for control of energy resources.  This is anecdotally supported by the nature 
of their equity investments, which often constitute the purchase of local joint ventures or 
production concessions from western supermajors.  It also supports the market-seeking motive, 
as countries with an existing presence of foreign energy firms presumably tend to have better-
developed energy markets than countries without these foreign investors.  The price of Brent 
crude oil was also of positive significance, at the 10% level, lending modest support to the 
hypothesis that energy investment increases with rising oil prices. 
As for the variables addressing the political support motive, a country’s similarity to 
China’s political system as expressed by the Polity IV score is not significant, but the presence of 
arms trade with China is of high positive significance, at the 1% level.  This suggests that there is 
indeed a motive of building political support for China in these energy investments, but that it is 
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more focused on fostering political and security cooperation with countries of varied regime 
types than just supporting countries who happen to have authoritarian systems similar to China’s.  
This is an inherently pragmatic expression of foreign policy: supporting countries willing to 
cooperate regardless of their regime types.  It also suggests a particular focus on security/defense 
cooperation, rather than simply diplomatic or economic cooperation.  This fits with China’s 
foreign affairs needs: its security influence in foreign affairs lags far behind its economic 
influence.  Accordingly, its leadership may be attempting to increasingly bundle security 
cooperation with economic cooperation, including through relating energy investments to arms 
deals.  The existance of a tenous link between China’s arms deals and foreign aid has been 
discussed by Dreher et al (2014) and Wang et al (2013); my results suggest that a stronger link 
exists between arms deals and energy investment. 
Regionally (with East & Southeast Asia as the baseline), Chinese energy investors appear 
to prefer investing in Central Asia, Oceania, and Latin America, significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels respectively.  The preference for Central Asia (including Russia) is easily explained 
anecdotally: it is a region China has expended great efforts to foster economic and security 
cooperation with, most notably through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  Russia 
is China’s most powerful foreign policy ally as well as a close economic partner.  Although 
Central Asia is indeed in China’s geographic backyard, the focus on this region in particular over 
the rest of Asia strongly suggests the importance of a political support motive for investment.  
The preferences for Oceania and Latin America are also fairly unsurprising.  Oceania is 
geographically close to China, and it counts Australia as a major trade partner.  Likewise, China 
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has made a well-publicized push to expand its economic and political influence into Latin 
America, especially Venezuela and fellow BRIC29 Brazil (Sanderson & Forsythe, 2013). 
Comparing the main model in Column 2 to the model limited to only the initially 
observed values of OFDI (Column 1), the results are generally similar.  Significant exceptions 
are that in the limited model the Brent crude price is not significant, GDP growth is of positive 
significance at the 10% level, and oil reserves is significant at the 1% level instead of the 10% 
level.  The dummy variable for non-missing values of OFDI was not significant, so investment 
does not appear to be biased towards or against countries where the level of Chinese OFDI is 
reported.  Instead, I attribute these different results to the change in sample selection, as the main 
model included close to twice the observations of the limited model. 
8.2 Heckman Selection Model Results 
The first stage of the Heckman model uses a Probit model with random effects to report 
the factors affecting the selection of which countries received energy investment, while the 
second stage uses a GLS regression with random effects to report the determinants of how much 
investment was granted.  Again, the initial model (Columns 1 and 2) estimates only the 
originally reported observations, while the main model (Columns 3 and 4) also includes the 
dummy variable for non-missing values of OFDI. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 Brazil, Russia, India, and China.  Sometimes also labeled as BRICS, including South Africa. 
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Table 3.2: Heckman Selection Model Results 
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For the first stage of the main model (Column 3)—the initial decision of whether or not 
to invest—the estimation results generally mirror the results of the Tobit model.  In fact, all of 
the non-time and geography explanatory variables in the first stage meet the same significance 
thresholds as in the Tobit model, with the exception of that oil production is of positive 
significance at the 10% level in the first stage of the Heckman.  At face value, this is a surprising 
result, as it suggest that the determinants of whether or not to invest as estimated in the Probit 
model that constitutes the first stage are effectively the same as the determinants of how much to 
invest as estimated in the Tobit model. 
However, in the second stage (Column 4), which addresses the determinants of how 
much to invest while holding constant for the factors that led to the selection of investment, the 
results are dramatically different.  The significance of GDP, IOC presence, the Brent crude price, 
and arms trade disappears, while the significance of per-capita GDP falls to the 5% level.  
Instead, Chinese OFDI is of positive significance at the 5% level, while the significance of oil 
reserves rises to the 1% level.  These results imply that once the decision to grant energy 
investment to a country has been made, the country’s level of oil reserves—its long-term ability 
to supply China with oil—becomes the most significant factor in determining the amount of 
investment to grant, followed by the market-seeking and cost-reduction motives as indicated by 
OFDI and per-capita GDP.  In essence, while the [oil] resource-seeking motive is initially just 
one of several motives, once investment has been made it becomes a more central motive for 
granting a larger amount of investment.  This fits with Qian’s (2011) use of a two-stage 
Heckman model to analyze overall Chinese OFDI in oil-producing nations, as he found that 
while a country’s energy endowments were not significant in the first stage of determining where 
to invest, they were significant in the second stage of determining how much to invest.  Again, 
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this is specifically for oil, mirroring the findings of Mocker (2014) and in line with my 
background research showing China’s domestic oil production to be especially deficient to its 
consumption. 
Geographically, the second stage of the Heckman model demonstrates a preference for 
Central Asia and Oceania (each at the 5% level), and also demonstrates a modest preference for 
Europe (at the 10% level).  The Middle East is of negative significance at the 10% level.  The 
rationale for Europe may fit within the second component of the resource-seeking motive in the 
theoretical framework: technology and managerial-expertise seeking.  As the investments in 
Europe are exclusively equity investments, generally targeted at major firms from developed 
countries, it is plausible that Chinese firms prefer to make larger investments in European energy 
firms in order to gain access to their advanced technology and managerial expertise.  With 
regards to the Middle East, while China receives a large share of its oil imports from the Middle 
East as displayed in Figure 1.2, it apparently does not prefer the region as a target for its largest 
volumes of energy investment.  I argue this is primarily due to the tight control many of that 
region’s governments hold over their energy resources, indicated in the data by the lack of IOC 
presence in many Middle East countries.  As these countries often have extensive energy 
resources but are less likely to permit foreign energy firm presence, it is logical that they serve as 
a source of imports yet not a target for foreign investment in the energy sector.  Security 
concerns may provide additional explanations. 
8.3 Simultaneous Equations Results 
 My simultaneous equations model uses a 2SLS estimation to produce results for the 
determinants of both the amount of Chinese energy investment (Column 1) and the amount of 
Chinese OFDI (Column 2), with each of these variables included as an explanatory variable for 
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the other.  Again, the goal here is both to estimate the determinants of energy investment while 
holding constant for how overall OFDI is determined, while also gaining insight into the two-
way relationship between energy investment and OFDI.  The goal is not to provide a 
comprehensive model for the estimation of OFDI, as that is the focus of other research and 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  It is simply to address OFDI to the extent that it has a 
relationship with energy investment.30 
Table 3.3: Simultaneous Equations Estimation Results 
 
                                                          
30 Here, the size of the estimation sample differs slightly as it is the current, and not the lagged, values of OFDI that 
are being used. 
(1) (2)
VARIABLES LABELS Log of Investment (MM USD) Log of FDI (MM USD)
l_lngdp Natural Log of Real GDP (t-1) 0.071 0.029
(0.050) (0.046)
l_lnper_cap Natural Log of Per-Capita GDP (t-1) -0.122*** -0.169***
(0.043) (0.034)
l_growth GDP Growth (t-1) 0.008 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
l_china_growth China's GDP Growth (t-1) -0.053 -0.040
(0.033) (0.031)
l_ioc Number of international oil  companies present (t-1) 0.244*** 0.281***
(0.051) (0.054)
l_polity Polity Score Difference with China (t-1) 0.012 -0.014**
(0.007) (0.006)
arms =1 if arms deals made with China 0.514*** 0.543***
(0.128) (0.121)
l_lnoil_res Natural Log of Oil Reserves (t-1) 0.325***
(0.044)
lnfdi Natural Log of Chinese Outward FDI -0.001
(0.123)
trend Time Trend 0.199 0.819***
(0.131) (0.069)
trend2 Time Trend Squared -0.008 -0.045***
(0.007) (0.004)
l_lnexports Natural Log of Chinese Exports (t-1) 0.302***
(0.034)
lntot_invest Natural Log of Total Energy Investment 0.048
(0.124)
Constant Constant -1.336 -4.732***
(1.173) (0.711)
Observations 2,096 2,096
R-squared 0.194 0.396
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In contrast to the second stage of the Heckman model, these estimations suggest that 
Chinese OFDI is not a significant determinant of energy investment, as the coefficient on OFDI 
in Column 1 is not significant.  They also show that overall OFDI does not follow energy 
investment, as total energy investment is not significant as an explanatory variable impacting 
OFDI (Column 2).  Essentially, Chinese energy investments and non-energy investments appear 
to be determined independently of each other.  This provides further backing for the findings of 
the previous models, as it demonstrates that they are estimating the determinants of specifically 
energy investments, and not simply the determinants of OFDI as has been investigated by prior 
research.  It also suggests that the significance of OFDI for energy investment as found in the 
second stage of the Heckman model is likely biased by the endogeneity of the OFDI variable, as 
this relationship is not durable when the determinants of each are estimated simultaneously. 
As in the Tobit model, per-capita GDP is of negative significance for the amount of 
energy investment at the 1% level (Column 1), while IOC presence and arms trade are of 
positive significance at the 1% level.  Oil reserves serves as an effective instrument for energy 
investment, of positive significance at the 1% level, mirroring the results in the second stage of 
the Heckman model.  This provides some further confirmation of the significance of the energy 
access motive for the amount of investment granted as suggested by the Heckman model.  GDP, 
however, was not significant, in contrast to the Tobit model. 
Regarding the determinants of FDI (Column 2), per-capita GDP is again of negative 
significance at the 1% level, while IOC presence and arms trade are of positive significance at 
the 1% level.  It appears that some strategies for energy investment as identified previously—
reducing costs by operating in low-income countries and building political support through 
targeting countries engaging in arms trade with China—are not specific to energy investments, 
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but are generally descriptive of Chinese foreign investment.  This is in line with the theoretical 
model, as the profit and political support motives were developed on the basis of the theoretical 
literature for overall FDI, not just energy investment.  While the significance of low per-capita 
GDP for OFDI had been found by Cheng & Ma (2010) and Qian (2011), the significance of arms 
trade is more novel.  The significance of IOC presence for OFDI is harder to explain, as this 
variable stems from the energy access component of the theoretical model that was assumed to 
be specific to energy investments.  However, the presence of IOCs may also indicate that a 
country is more generally attractive to foreign investment, not just that it has greater energy 
resources.31  Along these lines, it is expected that Chinese OFDI and not just energy investment 
would target countries with a large presence of foreign energy firms, although the strength of the 
relationship is still surprising. 
Chinese exports serves its part as an instrument of OFDI, of positive significance at the 
1% level.  In contrast to all of the energy investment models, political similarity as indicated by 
the Polity IV score was significant, with the difference in a country’s score with China’s score 
being of negative significance at the 5% level.  This indicates that the greater the differences 
between a target country’s political system and China’s political system, the less OFDI that 
country can be expected to receive.  This indicates that while the hypothesis that Chinese 
investors would prefer countries with political systems similar to China’s was not confirmed for 
energy investments, it does appear to be the case for overall foreign investment.  While it is not 
within the scope of this thesis to confirm the accuracy of that relationship with a comprehensive 
model for FDI, it does allow me to suggest that energy investment appears a more apolitical form 
                                                          
31 With the inclusion of a variable for the natural log of IFDI Stock to proxy for general attractiveness towards 
foreign investment, IOC remained significant at the 1% level.  Perhaps it serves as a better proxy for general 
attractiveness to Chinese investment than IFDI Stock, which Qian (2011) used for this purpose. 
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of Chinese investment: making no distinction amongst different political systems, while overall 
Chinese FDI appears to do so.  This implies that for energy investments, the political motives 
receive a lower weighting of importance relative to other foreign investments. 
 
9. Conclusion and Implications 
From the starting point of a theoretical model that proposes market-seeking, 
efficiency/cost-reduction, resource-seeking, and political support as major motives for Chinese 
foreign energy investment, my empirical results have found that all of these motives are indeed 
significant determinants of energy investment.  Initially, Chinese energy investors’ commercial 
motives, resource-seeking motives, and political motives all appear to receive significant weight 
in their investment decisions.  Investors seek to maximize profit through both seeking revenue 
sources in new markets, as suggested by the positive significance of GDP and oil production, and 
by reducing costs through moving operations to developing countries, as suggested by the 
negative significance of per-capita GDP.  They seek to gain control of oil resources, as indicated 
by the positive significance of oil reserves, and are willing to compete with the largest western 
energy firms for control of these reserves as shown by the significance of IOC presence.  They 
also seek to reduce energy insecurity in times of high oil prices by increasing their investments in 
tandem with rising oil prices.  They prefer to invest in countries with which China is developing 
a strong security relationship, as indicated by the strong positive significance of arms trade.  
Geographically, they prefer regions where China has strong economic and political bonds: 
Central Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. 
However, when it comes to the amount of investment granted and not just which 
countries receive investment, the motivation to gain access to energy resources, specifically oil, 
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appears to take over as the most powerful motive for investment.  This is supported by the 
finding of oil reserves as the only non-time variable significant at the 1% level in the second 
stage of the Heckman Selection model.  Cost-reductions also remain a major motive, as indicated 
by the significance of per-capita GDP in this model.  The Heckman model also indicated the 
presence of the market access motive through the significance of Chinese OFDI, yet this finding 
is more questionable as the significance of OFDI did not hold up in the simultaneous equations 
model.  This conclusion supports the claim that Chinese energy investors consider not merely 
their commercial interests, but also, as Chen Yuan stated, “what China really needs” (Mocker, 
2014, pg. 23) given its energy security dilemma, oil supplies being at the top of that list.   
It also appears that energy investment decisions are determined separately from other 
types of Chinese foreign investment, as demonstrated by the 2SLS simultaneous equations model 
which rejected any significant relationship between energy investment and OFDI.  Several traits 
of energy investment appear to be generally descriptive of Chinese foreign investment, namely a 
preference for developing countries with lower costs, for countries with a large presence of oil 
and gas supermajors, and for countries engaging in arms trade with China.  However, the oil-
seeking motive appears to be a particular focus of energy investment, determined separately from 
other forms of foreign investment.  Thus, findings of prior research including Cheung & Qian 
(2009) and Qian (2011) that energy resource endowments are a major determinant of Chinese 
foreign investment may have been descriptive simply of the energy investment component of 
that investment.  Moreover, energy investment appears to actually be less politically-motivated 
than overall Chinese foreign investment, as it does not demonstrate a preference for countries 
with similar political systems as overall OFDI does in my model. 
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The deliberate effort by Chinese investors to gain control over large volumes of global oil 
supplies has major implications for both China’s domestic economy and the global energy 
market.  Chinese officials have for some time desired long-term control and equity holdings over 
oil supplies, having a “strong distrust of energy markets” (Qian, 2011, pg. 13).  With regards to 
its domestic economy, steady access to global sources of oil will enhance China’s energy 
security as its own domestic consumption continues to outpace its domestic production.  
Successfully using its global investments to gain access to oil supplies, therefore, is critical for 
China to maintain robust economic growth in the future, enabling the government to continue to 
keep domestic energy prices artificially low.  Globally, Chinese investors will gain immense 
influence over global energy markets, including the ability to help stabilize prices in times of 
market turmoil.  They could most directly affect prices through adjusting supply, such as by 
increasing or decreasing the share of the guaranteed shipments they receive through energy-
backed loans that are sold to global markets rather than to the domestic market in China. 
Additionally, the persistent significance of arms trade for energy investment strongly 
suggests a link between energy investments and China’s global security policy, as it seeks to 
build allies amongst major energy-producing states.  As energy investments appear to follow 
arms trade, I propose that China is using its immense economic resources to support the 
development of countries that have demonstrated a willingness to engage in security cooperation 
with China.  This has the potential to strengthen China’s global influence by promoting the 
economic development of its allies, as well as to serve as an incentive for other states to engage 
in security cooperation with China in the hope that it will lead to future energy investment.  This 
can also be interpreted as feeding back into China’s desire to secure access to energy resources, 
as having allies amongst energy-producing states could help grant China preferential access to 
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their resources.  This finding suggests the need for further research into the connections between 
arms trade and other forms of Chinese global economic activity, such as the link between arms 
trade and foreign aid suggested by Wang et al (2013) and Dreher et al (2014). 
The fact that the commercial motives for Chinese energy investment are mixed with 
energy security and political motives should also raise some concern about the financial 
prudence of these investments.  The fact that Chinese energy investors’ actions also seem to 
serve the state’s goals to acquire energy resources and support Chinese security policy abroad 
implies that they may not always act in their best financial interests.  This is the argument 
recognized by Downs (2011), Jiang & Sinton (2011), and Forsythe & Sanderson (2013), that 
even when Chinese investors seem to prioritize their commercial interests, they at some level 
still must conform to state goals.  Forsythe & Sanderson (2013) argue that the determination of 
the China Development Bank’s energy-backed loans have been especially tied to the service of 
state goals, above all oil access, and their case studies suggest this has indeed led the CDB to 
make financially questionable investments, most pertinently their almost $50 billion in energy-
backed loans to Venezuela, a country which Moody’s has assigned a Caa3 sovereign credit 
rating (2015).32  The use of foreign energy investments to address domestic energy security has 
the potential to enormously benefit China’s domestic economic prospects.  However, the 
potential for some of these investments to experience major losses could also bring a severe 
economic blow to a nation whose financial markets are already extremely shaken. 
While this research was able to conclude that motives of market access, cost reductions, 
energy access, and political support are all meaningful determinants of Chinese foreign energy 
investment, and provide some insight as to their relative importance at different stages of 
                                                          
32 The rating was assigned in 2015; the various loans analyzed in this study were all made prior to 2015. 
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decision making, its ability to more precisely define the relative significance of the various 
motives for investment was highly limited by data availability.  In particular, knowledge of the 
profits and losses of Chinese investors by country or by investment would have enabled me to 
construct better theoretical and empirical models of the determinants of profit for the different 
types of investors.  Additionally, there is a need for greater understanding of the political benefits 
that China receives from its investments, in terms of diplomatic and security support from target 
countries, to accurately proxy the degree to which target countries support China politically.  The 
dependent variable of energy investment was also limited to large, publicly reported equity 
investments and loans, while there is additional investment in the form of Greenfield investments 
and smaller, non-public investments that I was not able to observe.  If future research is able to 
acquire greater access to this information, it will be able to provide greater insight into Chinese 
energy investors’ decision-making. 
However, I believe the greatest challenge for further research will be not just to analyze 
the determinants of investments, but also to analyze the effects of Chinese energy investments on 
their target countries.  As the vast majority of these investments have been made only in the last 
decade, this project may not be feasible at the time of writing, but as time passes and new data 
becomes available, the effect of these investments on target countries’ economic performance, 
energy sectors, governance, and relationships with China will be a tantalizing question to 
address.  Ultimately, the greatest questions of China’s foreign energy investments regard not 
only how these investments will affect China, but also how they will affect the myriad nations 
who have in such a short period received massive inflows of energy investment from China. 
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Appendix A: Expanded Specification of Selected Equations 
Equation 1.1: Tobit Model with Random Effects 
ln (𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽2ln (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽3ln (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽5𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎(𝑡−1) + 𝛽6ln (𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽7ln (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽8𝐼𝑂𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽9𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑡−1) + 𝛽10𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝐵12𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽13𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 is a vector for both oil and natural gas production, 𝑅𝑒𝑠 is a vector for both oil and 
natural gas reserves, and 𝑇 is a vector for both time trend and time trend squared. 
Equation 2.1: First Stage of Heckman Selection Model 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛾2ln (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛾3ln (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛾4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛾5𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎(𝑡−1) + 𝛾6ln (𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛾7ln (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛾8𝐼𝑂𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛾9𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑡−1) + 𝛾10𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾11𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾12𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾13𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾14𝑇𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Equation 2.2: Second Stage of Heckman Selection Model 
ln (𝐸𝐼𝑖𝑡) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1ln (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛿2ln (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛿3ln (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛿4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛿5𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎(𝑡−1) + 𝛿6ln (𝑃𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛿7ln (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛿8𝐼𝑂𝐶𝑖(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛿9𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑡−1) + 𝛿10𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿11𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛿12𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿13𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿14𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
 
